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Preface 
This paper was presented at a workshop in Pretoria, South Africa in February 2003, as a 
contribution to the research project ”Developing a normative framework for effective and efficient 
social security provisioning: an institutional perspective”, financed by The Research Council of 
Norway and The National Research Foundation, South Africa. The project (2002–2005) 
is a cooperative project between the Rokkan Centre and The Centre for International 
Law and Comparative Labour and Social Secuirty Law, Rand Afrikaans University, 
Johannesburg. The author wishes to thank the participants of the workshop for valuable 
comments.  
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Summary 
This working paper is based on the ideas that “social justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions” and that democratic governing principles should be “transparent”, that is, 
known and available for public consideration and examination. As welfare institutions 
express various, partly inconsistent values and principles, three normative tensions are 
discussed that are salient in today’s welfare discourses: (1) the tension between social 
rights and personal responsibilities (2) the tension between autonomy and paternalism, 
(3) the tension between individual rights and family responsibilities. The significance of 
identifying and discussing such normative tensions is elucidated by analyses that indicate 
some consequences of the different normative arguments in terms of welfare and 
justice.  
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Sammendrag 
Notatet tar utgangspunkt i idéene om at “sosial rettferdighet er sosiale institusjoners 
første dyd” (Rawls) og at demokratiske styringsprinsipper bør være “gjennomsiktige”, 
dvs tilgjengelige for “alle” for offentlig analyse og diskusjon. Etter som velferdsstatens  
institusjonene uttrykker sammensatte og til dels motstridende verdier og prinsipper, 
drøftes tre normative spenninger som er fremtredende i dagens velferds-diskurser: (1) 
spenningen mellom sosiale rettigheter og personlig ansvar (2) spenningen mellom 
autonomi og paternalisme, (3) spenningen mellom individuelle rettigheter og familiens 
ansvar for borgernes velferd. Betydningen av å identifisere slike normative spenningsfelt 
blir belyst ved drøftinger av de konsekvensene de ulike prinsippene kan få for 
fordelingen av velferd. 
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Introduction  
The first virtue of social institutions is justice, says Rawls (1971: 3). This implies the fair 
distribution of benefits and burdens, rights and duties, and a treatment of everyone with 
equal respect. No matter how efficient and well-arranged laws and institutions are, they 
must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Ideally speaking, society should be a 
transparent social order where the governing principles are known and available for 
public consideration and examination, defence or rejection. “People should know and 
understand the reasons for the basic distribution of wealth, power, authority and 
freedom” (Waldron 1993: 61). In other words, a legitimate social order is one that is 
“capable of explaining itself at the tribunal of each person’s understanding” (ibid.).  
The aim of this South-African/Norwegian project is in line with these ideas. The 
ambition is to develop a normative framework for the “proper functioning” of social 
security institutions in South Africa. Thus, the expression “proper functioning” refers 
not only to the efficiency of social security provisions, but also to the moral basis of the 
system, to the norms and values expressed in and promoted by particular welfare 
institutions and programmes. The focus of the project is on standard setting and the 
development of relevant, justifiable norms that can obtain legitimacy amongst the 
persons affected, “the stakeholder community and the population at large”.1 What 
standards should be chosen and on what grounds? May seemingly successful 
institutional arrangements in other countries, like the Scandinavian, be applicable in the 
South African (and SADEC) context? Apart from economic resources, how important 
are differences in social and political cultures for principles of redistribution and the 
distribution of rights and duties?  
Generally speaking, empirical and normative studies are far apart in welfare research. 
Nevertheless, a combination of the two may seem an optimal research strategy, since 
this approach makes it possible to raise the following three critical questions: What 
should the state do? And, what in fact can it do – does the state have the capacity to do 
what is required to remedy injustices, according to how these are defined? (cf. Rothstein 
1998: 8–9). If not, is it possible to build state capacity? In other words, the “proper 
functioning” of social institutions cannot be achieved by means of pragmatic and 
normative arguments alone – the state’s ability is also fundamental. Prescriptions must 
be feasible; “ought implies can”.    
Public justification and legitimacy are vital to the stability of democratic social 
institutions. In modern societies political decisions and arrangements can no longer be 
justified exclusively with reference to tradition and common ethical views; citizens in a 
multicultural world cannot be comfortable with the fact that policies conform to certain 
culturally specific ideas and conceptions. Accordingly, policies and principles should be 
impartially justified, which make it necessary to reflect on several obvious “truths” 
about our own cultures; about the family, the local community, the state, religion, and 
                                                 
1 Cf. the description of the project Developing a Normative Framework for Effective and Efficient Social Security Provisioning: An 
Institutional Perspective. The Research Council of Norway and the National Research Foundation, South Africa. 
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so forth. The answers may well correspond to traditional thoughts. What matters is that 
questions are raised, that answers are argued for and that they are acceptable to those 
affected. 
In modern societies, welfare is dependent on a varied mix of inputs from three 
primary pillars: the public institutions, the labour market and the family/civil society. 
Yet, even if roads to welfare are multiple, the sole institution with the power to ease 
social injustices is the state. And an ambitious welfare state should be concerned with the 
fair distribution of opportunities. More or less, it guarantees a minimum standard of 
income, health and education in a way that releases the individual from “brute luck” 
differences in personal characteristics (background, natural talents etc.).   
Having presented the welfare state as an institution aimed at social justice, it has to 
be emphasised that welfare policies express a mixture of reasons for welfare; some 
pragmatic, others moral (concerning “justice”) or ethical (concerning “the good life”). 
Thus, by digging into the normative basis of the welfare state, tensions and dilemmas 
are revealed that may explain some feelings of discontent with the welfare state. On the 
other hand, once tensions and dilemmas have been exposed and reflected on, they may 
explicitly be taken into consideration when restructuring or designing welfare 
institutions. In this paper I will discuss three normative tensions that currently are 
salient in western welfare discourses, though the illustrations are mainly drawn from the 
Scandinavian welfare states:  
1) the tension between social rights and personal responsibilities 
2) the tension between autonomy and paternalism 
3) the tension between individual rights and family responsibilities. 
Social  r ights versus personal 
responsibi l i t ies 
Welfare states do not follow a unified logic. In response to broadly similar challenges, 
public arrangements differ according to national institutional paths (Leibfried and 
Obinger 2001). Nevertheless, among the diversity of welfare state systems, more or less 
distinctive patterns of institutional design have emerged that express some common 
ideals and values. This applies especially to the Scandinavian welfare states. Whether 
described as an “institutional redistributive model” (Titmuss 1958) or a “social demo-
cratic welfare-state regime” (Esping-Andersen 1990), one of the most distinctive traits 
of Scandinavian welfare policies is that public benefits are instituted as social rights to 
high-level benefits. In principle, the schemes are universal, covering all residents 
regardless of achievements or financial means.  
Yet this universality is restricted in all known welfare policies; the benefits are 
generally categorical, related to politically defined needs arising in different phases of life 
like old age,  sickness, unemployment etc. Furthermore, the benefits are far from 
independent of the citizens’ work-related conduct. Even if the social security systems 
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have a broad coverage, nearly all of them include earnings-related supplementary 
pension schemes and some of them cater exclusively for employees. Thus, the work 
requirement is an important admission ticket to the security system and the duty to work 
is an essential component of the normative structure of Scandinavian welfare states.  
The importance of this duty is particularly evident in the treatment of poor people 
who may be suspected of evading their work duties and of free-riding by living off the 
labour of others. Even if the Scandinavian welfare states have gradually defined more 
risks as responsibilities of the state and thus expanded the legitimate needs for 
protection, they do not cover them all. Needy citizens, who neither receives income 
from wealth or work, nor have needs that fit into the categorical income-security 
system, are rescued by residual safety nets, highly discretionary Social Assistance Acts. 
This reluctance to include the very poor – but not the very rich – in the 
comprehensive social security systems indicates that these systems are designed first and 
foremost to secure the social rights of working people, of those who demonstrate a will 
to work, and that have acceptable reasons when not working (Terum 1996). Accordingly, 
this “two-tier” welfare system, whereby the great majority of clients are served through 
universal programmes, while a very small minority is subject to stigmatising, means-
tested programs, exhibits a basic normative tension of the Scandinavian welfare states, 
between the goals of securing basic goods for all residents and of enforcing the duty to work. 
This tension seems to rise to the surface particularly in economically challenging times. 
For instance, an important normative issue for the EU, the OECD, the World Bank and 
most Western welfare states today is to reach a balance between citizen’s rights and duties, 
or more specifically: to strengthen the duty to work. This idea of a “new welfare 
contract” between the citizen and the state obliges clients to perform work as a re-
payment to the community for received social benefits. For this work they receive 
neither ordinary wages nor protection from usual labour rights. By strengthening the 
duty to work in this way at the expense of the citizen’s social rights, workfare-similar 
policies are evading the critical question for every just welfare state: whether 
worklessness or unemployment is caused by lack of will or lack of options.   
A diagnosis of the Western welfare states presented in a frequently cited OECD 
report from 1981 has deeply influenced recent Western welfare discourses and the 
welfare reforms made during the 1990s. This report states that the emphasis on passive 
entitlements has produced serious problems for the welfare state. Rights without duties 
lead to counterproductive effects such as passivity, dependency and social 
marginalization, but first and foremost, they produce disincentives to work. These effects 
undermine not only economic growth and wealth, but also the recipients’ own well-
being. Rather than improving the prospect for a better life, the welfare state lessens the 
clients’ prospects.  
The key concept in this diagnosis is “social rights”.  “No rights without responsibilities” is 
the famous slogan, indicating that citizens’ responsibilities have vanished, and that rights 
and responsibilities are correlated. However, conceptually, there is no correlation 
between a person’s rights and the same person’s duties. On the contrary, rights correlate 
with duties in the sense that rights are the grounds for other people’s duties. By definition, 
to have a right means to have a claim on a certain treatment from others. The widely 
accepted assertion, that a person’s rights are conditional on the person’s fulfilment of 
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special duties, like the duty to work, is accordingly not a logical, but a moral one that has 
to be argued for. Yet, the reason why a logical correlation between individual rights and 
duties seems to be accepted without arguments could be that a society’s legal rights 
often are conferred by general rules that apply to classes of persons. Characteristically, 
any of these persons are also members of the class of those on which the correlated 
duties are imposed (Feinberg 1973:62).  
Obviously, welfare systems are heavy financial burdens, for the state, for industry 
and for the citizens. This applies in particular to universalistic systems of the 
Scandinavian type, where social rights to benefits and services, at least in principle, are 
independent of financial means and work-history. Consequently, a prerequisite for such 
welfare systems has been a political commitment to full employment. Among western 
welfare states, the Scandinavian countries enjoy the highest rates of employment, 
including the highest rates of female employment, and the most comprehensive active 
labour market programmes. In other words, an important element of the internal logic 
in these welfare states is the close relation between the institution of welfare and the 
institution of work; the Scandinavian countries stand out as both “strong welfare states” 
and “strong work societies”.  
A “full employment society” requires well-functioning labour markets. However, this 
may not be the only condition. Today’s critics of social rights stress, like the OECD in 
1981, that the quality of a democratic welfare state not only depends on the justice of its 
basic structures, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens (Kymlicka & 
Norman 1994). This statement may be supported by some empirical information. For 
instance, in 1954 a “right to work” was incorporated in the Norwegian constitution. It 
was discussed whether the citizen’s duty to work also should be incorporated in the text. 
However, the parliamentary debates clearly demonstrated that the Norwegian politicians 
had no worries about the work ethics; the citizen’s natural and positive relation to work 
was taken for granted (Eybenz & Smith 1958: 142). 
Thus the morality of work has also been a precondition for the move towards the “full 
employment” society and the growth of comprehensive, generous welfare states, which 
leads to the conclusion that there certainly is a moral correlation between rights and 
duties, between social welfare and citizens’ virtues. This morality of work is lucidly 
expressed in the Swedish phrase the conscientious worker (“den skötsamme arbetaren”): the 
respectable, decent, properly behaved worker. Two influential associations in the latter 
part of the 19th century, the labour and the temperance movements fostered this ideal, 
both strongly influenced by Protestantism (Ambjörnsson 1988; Bjørnson 2001). “The 
conscientious worker” was a proud, strong-willed person; he had strength of character 
and took responsibility for his own and others’ acts. He was the man that had a justified 
right to protection when hit by bad luck. 
In summary, I wish to stress that the tension between the right to security and the duty 
to work is inherent in all welfare states, although the most comprehensive ones, like the 
Scandinavian, presumably experience this tension most acutely. The only social security 
programme that can dissolve this normative dilemma is a universal Basic Income 
unconditionally granted to every resident within a certain area, without means testing or 
work requirement. However, the fact that this idea only exists as a “desk-idea” obviously 
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relates to the new normative and empirical challenges that this scheme rises, of which 
two are basic: Is it fair? Can we afford it?  
Secondly, there are good reasons to suggest that all welfare state policies, universal 
ones in particular, presuppose some kind of political and social culture “with enlightened 
participants who are willing to conduct their lives in accordance with internalised 
constraints” (Skirbekk 1996: 32). Public policy obviously relies on responsible lifestyle 
decisions in many ways. The state will for instance be unable to provide adequate health 
care if citizens do not act responsibly with respect to their own health, in terms of eating 
and drinking habits, exercising etc. Furthermore, the state would not have the capacity 
to meet the needs of children, the sick and disabled people and the elderly, if citizens did 
not agree to share this responsibility by providing some care for their relatives. That is, 
without co-operation and trust between the authorities and citizens, the ability of 
welfare states to function properly disappears (Kymlicka & Norman 1994).  
However, given that the quality of a democratic welfare state depends on the norms 
and attitudes of its citizens, and also that these have changed during the last decades, the 
currant welfare-to-work reforms do not seem to be an adequate answer to the OECD-
diagnosis. A main reason is that these reforms fails to realize that the world today is 
different from what it was when the welfare states were being formed and the 
protestant-based work ethic was an inextricable dimension of the socio-cultural 
foundation of Western societies. Yet, the possible fact that the religious basis of the 
work ethics has dissolved does not inevitably imply that the motivation for work has 
dwindled altogether – studies indicate that the motivation to work has become an aspect 
of today’s self-realisation ideology. Thus, even if the tension between basic social security 
and the duty to work seem to be inevitable in any democratic welfare state, the designing 
of welfare reforms needs to take the challenges of a changed world of work, 
opportunities, norms and motivations into account, and not only echo the policies from 
a world we have lost.  
Paternal ism versus autonomy 
The principle of “autonomy” or “self-determination” is basic to constitutional 
democracy, and it is an important justifying principle for the welfare state. Hence, it is a 
paradox that the citizens’ autonomy seems to be restricted by some kind of paternalism 
inherent in the welfare state.  
In any social interaction between human beings there is a potential for conflict 
between interests. Consequently, all forms of social relations require certain restrictions 
on individual freedom. A critical question for any democratic state is therefore: What 
restrictions on individual freedom can be justified as legitimate, and what cannot?  
In his classic essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill discusses the nature and limits of the 
power that society can legitimately exercise over the individual. He advocates “the harm 
principle”, which states that: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant” (Mill 1859/1991: 
14, my italics). “Harm to self” is today discussed under the heading of “paternalism”. In 
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current debates, though, a distinction is often made between “strong” and “weak” 
paternalism. The former refers to interventions in the lives of autonomous people 
against their will, whereas the latter refers to intervention in the lives of people who are 
not fully autonomous.  
Mill’s “harm principle” – no one’s liberty may be constrained except to prevent harm 
to others – is acknowledged by virtually everyone, although frequently combined with 
additional requirements (see below). However, this principle is far from being a precise 
guide for the ideal legislator: The concept of “harm” is quite ambiguous, which makes 
the distinction between harm to self and harm to others indistinct as well. Since “no person 
is an entirely isolated being” (ibid.: 88), there are many subtle and indirect ways in which 
individual acts may affect others. For instance, is a helmet requirement for motorcyclists 
merely intended to protect the life and health of the cyclist, or is it also intended to 
protect others? Does drug abuse only harm the abuser? Although Mill anticipated this 
objection, he still maintained that the distinction was valid, arguing that some actions are 
obviously “other-regarding”, while others are chiefly “self-regarding”, leaving some 
cases in a twilight zone difficult to classify. “No person ought to be punished simply for 
being drunk”, he wrote, although a drunken soldier or policeman on duty should indeed 
be punished (ibid.: 90).2 In other cases the “harm principle” merges nearly imperceptibly 
into the principle of “harm to self”, as discussions about a new and rather restrictive 
smoking legislation in Norway illustrate. The authorities argue on the basis of the 
principle of “harm to others” in ways that also implies restrictions on liberty based on 
“harm to self”, even though the latter is far more controversial.  
However, this mingling of arguments illustrates the criticism that has been raised 
against the “harm principle”; it has been considered too restrictive regarding legitimate 
interference in people’s affairs. Feinberg lists 6 additional valid grounds for coercion 
that have been proposed, of which the liberty-limiting principles preventing “harm to 
self” and to “benefit the self” are perhaps the most salient ones that are said to justify 
restrictions on a person’s liberty (Feinberg 1973: 33). The principles of “harm to self” 
and “benefit the self” justify state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted 
harm, or to guide them, against or according to their own will, in the same way as 
parents guide their children.  
The normative tension between autonomy and paternalism becomes particularly 
apparent in social assistance laws, which allow the enforcement of state actions against 
the will of the recipients based on judgements about their well-being (Nilssen and Lien 
1999: 182). Thus, allocations of social assistance in general, but particularly coercive 
interventions in the lives of substance abusers, are characterised by a high degree of 
compulsion. Social workers are certainly concerned with human welfare. Yet the path 
toward promoting and maintaining this ambition is not always clear. Generally social 
workers encounter a wide variety of ethical dilemmas in their work with individuals and 
families that involve decisions to intervene in people’s lives that resist assistance. The 
question is then, under what circumstances is a social worker obliged to intervene; when 
                                                 
2 In short, whenever there is a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of 
the zone of liberty and placed in the province of morality or law (Mill ibid.). 
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is strong paternalism justified by the duty to help? For instance, should it be permissible 
for a client to choose to continue living with an abusive spouse? (Reamer 1990: 67, 78). 
The debate concerning the proper balance between a client’s right to adopt self-
destructive behaviour, and the social worker’s obligation to prevent harm to self, 
represents a never-ending tension between the value of self-determination and the justification 
of strong paternalism in any democratic welfare state. 
Paternalism essentially implies “a conflict between the right of clients to well-being 
and their right to freedom from interference or coercion” (Reamer 1990: 82). The 
normative issue at stake is how to provide care and help for the needy while maintaining 
respect for their freedom as fellow citizens? We may say that the design of welfare state 
institutions, benefits and services, generates a potential normative conflict between the 
principle of care and the principle of autonomy, as expressed in the “harm principle”. Even if 
professional knowledge and insight is used as a justification for paternalism, the 
question remains whether the welfare state’s doorkeepers are in a position to determine 
what is in another’s best interest (Beauchamp 1991: 412).  
On the other hand, while Mill’s model of paternalistic government belongs to the 
realm of autonomous persons, the huge number of those taken care of by the welfare 
state are in fact not fully autonomous; they are drug-abusers, mentally ill, nearly brain-
dead etc. This implies that, while paternalism in a “strong” sense – intervention in an 
autonomous person’s life in order to prevent “harm to self” or to benefit the self – may 
be controversial, virtually everyone acknowledges that some kind of “weak paternalism” 
– intervention in the lives and affairs of people who are not in a position to make 
voluntary choices – is justified. It is fairly uncontroversial to justify interventions when 
little or no autonomy is present (Beauchamp 1991: 413; Skirbekk 1996: 40). Even Mill 
would consent to this. Still, the problem is how to draw the line between autonomous 
and non-autonomous choices, or to be more precise, where to fix the critical point on 
the slippery voluntariness scale.  
Whereas the coercive interventions in autonomous lives made by social workers and 
other welfare state doorkeepers may be described as professional paternalism, a broader 
version of what has been labelled the “paternalism objection” to the welfare state, is 
described as welfare-state paternalism. The focus is the conflict of values inherent in the 
welfare state; the contradiction and normative tension between the ideas of equality and 
freedom. A good illustration is once more the Scandinavian welfare state, and especially 
the Swedish, which has been notably criticised for its inclination to “put people’s lives in 
order”, i.e. for its tendency to invade the sphere of family and private life with the 
purpose of creating a new, rational kind of citizen; “enlightened, well adjusted and 
socially committed” (Rothstein 1998: 172). Thus, welfare policy should not only correct 
inequalities in a fair way, but also show the way to a new society. Especially during the 
building of the welfare state, from the 1930s to the 60s, welfare reformers argued within 
the conceptual universe of social engineering; children should be brought up according 
to scientific methods applied by publicly appointed experts; housework was considered 
work for indolent and weak people etc. The issue at stake is the price that the benevolent 
aim of “putting lives in order” carries for the autonomy of citizens.  
Hence, welfare regulations in general, which are employed to secure equality and 
equal power positions, severely limit the scope of autonomous individuals to pursue 
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their lives according to their own ideas. Statuary regulations on work and family life 
force employees or family members to make their behaviour conform to “normal” work 
patterns or standard patterns of socialisation. Since welfare state institutions are 
designed to meet standardised risk situations, they function as normalising intrusions in 
people’s lives. The assertion that regulatory law consolidates stereotypes of identity and 
ways of life is inter alia a principal point of feminist criticism of the welfare state, and 
one that will be touched upon in the treatment of the third group of normative 
dilemmas raised by family policies.  
Even so, as a final point it is important to call attention to the fact that although 
strong paternalism, that is, legal coercion, is potentially challenging from a normative point 
of view, the social coercion exercised by civil society is no less problematic with regard to 
individual freedom. Moral pressure, social avoidance and humiliation; forms of coercion 
and punishment that is frequently used towards people who choose a divergent way of 
life, may far outdo welfare-state paternalism. While professionals and local 
administrators are granted considerable discretionary power to decide who should 
receive support from the welfare state, the force of un-professional moral pressures 
within families and civil society may be far more injurious to people’s freedom.  
Individual  r ights versus family 
responsibi l i t ies 
Regarding family policy, there are immense differences between welfare states. The 
Scandinavian welfare states, which have implemented comprehensive family policies, are 
characterised as “family-friendly”, which implies that their welfare policy programmes 
promote high labour force participation for both women and men in families with care 
responsibilities (Kuhnle, et al. 2003). One important goal is to lessen the burdens for 
families with children by increasing their options in the organisation of daily life. 
Compared to other Western welfare states, those of the Nordic countries offer the most 
extensive provisions for public welfare and care services for children and the elderly; 
they score high on the measure of social policies that support parents, and low on the 
measure of poverty among households with/without children and among lone parents, 
and they have the highest rates of fertility. While the countries with the lowest rates of 
female employment had the highest birth rates in the 1960s, countries with the highest 
rates of female employment have the highest birth rates today. Thus, “family-friendly” 
policies may also be described as “woman-friendly”; they consist of programmes that 
actively lessen the caring burdens of the family, which affect women in particular.  
In contrast, “familialistic” policies support traditional family values; they ascribe 
minimum welfare obligations to the state and maximum to the household. Such policies 
insist that households must carry the principal responsibility for their own members’ 
welfare. Catholic social teaching and the principle of subsidiarity tend to influence 
familialistic policies; the principle of subsidiarity asserts that public interference in 
people’s lives should be limited to situations where primary social networks, i.e. families, 
fail. It is a paradoxical, though empirical, fact that familialism goes hand in hand with a 
very passive and un-developed family policy, as can be seen in the cases of Italy and 
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Spain. It may also seem paradoxical that familialistic policies appear counterproductive 
to family formation (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45, 51, 67).  
Patterns of family life in the Scandinavian countries are closely related to the “family-
friendly” policies that have been implemented. Thirty years ago, the majority of women 
did not have their own income to live on; economically they were dependant on men. 
Child-care services were limited and the expectation that parents would share the 
responsibilities of care was rather unrealistic. During the 60s, however, there was a 
movement away from the traditional family model based on a male breadwinner and a 
female homemaker. While one-fifth of the working-age women in Sweden identified 
themselves as “housewives” in the mid-1970s, less that two percent did so in 2000 
(Wennemo 2001). And whereas some 45% of women aged 16–74 participated in the 
labour force at the beginning of the 70s, around 75 % of Scandinavian women are 
employed today. The proportion of household work performed by men has also 
increased significantly and the rights of fathers have been advanced. Thus, a double-
earner model has replaced the traditional male breadwinner model. Thanks not least to 
the active family policy, the realities of family life have undergone fundamental changes 
over the past thirty years. 
Not least gender differences are greatly affected by family policies, a fact which have 
raised criticism towards the ideas of gender equality expressed in Scandinavian family 
policies. Some critics maintain that these policies rest upon assumptions of women’s 
needs that are rather controversial (Borchorst & Siim 2003). It is questioned whether 
“women” have common interests and needs, and what these might be independent of 
their social, economic, ethnic and generational circumstances. What is “good” for 
women in general, and how should the state empower them? Habermas has raised this 
kind of criticism in his analysis of paternalistic welfare state policies. He claims that 
political support for female equality tends to benefit one category of women that is 
already privileged at the cost of other categories. Since gender-specific inequalities 
correlate in a complex and obscure manner with membership in other underprivileged 
groups (social class, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation etc.), the relevant legislation is 
based on “false” classifications (Habermas 1996: 416, 422–23).  
There are some obviously normative tensions inherent in family policies that arise 
from the opposition between the individual and the family or kinship group. Rights are 
always attributed to individuals, which in the family context means they are attributed to 
either mothers or fathers, women or men, with the aim of minimising their reliance on 
families and maximising their options and command over economic resources 
independently of familial or marital reciprocities (Esping-Andersen 1999: 45). 
Accordingly, these individual “family-friendly” rights may lead to a normative tension 
between the woman’s independent status, and her family. The effects of an active family 
and gender-friendly policy may thus be conducive to the destruction of traditional 
family life. Divorce rates in Scandinavia might be taken as a confirmation of this effect. 
This may be the price that has to be paid for policies that seek to unburden the 
household and diminish the individual’s welfare dependence on family and kinship 
groups. On the other hand, a familialistic welfare policy gives the individual no choice; it 
makes family life “an offer they can’t refuse”.  
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The tensions between individual “family-friendly” rights versus undisturbed family 
life may become more apparent in the near future. One obvious challenge is the 
movement towards multicultural societies that encompass various normative ideas of 
gender differences, children’s position in the family, the roles of parents etc., ideas that 
are likely to be provoked rather than superseded by an active, rights-based family policy. 
As policies in general have the power to change social structures and relations, active 
family policies obviously have the power to undermine and even destroy family models 
that are not favoured by welfare state policies. Especially, when considering other 
cultures it is important to keep in mind that the solutions that seem to have worked 
fairly well in the Scandinavian one may seem quite alien to others. Other challenges, 
such as insecure labour conditions and a redesign of welfare institutions in more 
achievement-oriented directions, may yet create other tensions between individual rights 
and family obligations. Today’s demarcation line between the state, the market and the 
family in the field of welfare responsibilities will probably be affected, though in which 
direction is an open question.  
A closing remark  
The importance of analysing normative assumptions and governing principles of welfare 
state institutions has been emphasised in this article. Furthermore, as welfare policies 
express a mixture of values and principles they tend to generate normative tensions and 
conflicts. Three such tensions have been explored. Whether these may be resolved or 
not has not been the issue. The ambition has been to identify and outline some 
normative aspects of social policies and to discuss some consequences in terms of 
welfare and justice. Furthermore it has been argued that although public welfare 
institutions may be problematic instruments regarding the mitigation of social injustices, 
they seem to be better fit to pursue this goal than the other main welfare pillars in force; 
the market and the family/civil society.  
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